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CONFRONTING FORENSICS:
BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Megan Weisgerber*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision
drastically altered the long-standing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, refocusing the constitutional inquiry on the testimonial
nature of a witness’s statement but leaving for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial.” Thus
began the current line of Confrontation Clause cases, each of which
sought to clarify the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation protections but
arguably clouded any clarity that the case before it brought. In 2009,
the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, in which it held
that a forensic laboratory report prepared for a criminal trial is
“testimonial” and that it therefore triggers the Confrontation Clause.
Most recently, in 2010, the Court decided Bullcoming v. New Mexico
and answered the question that Melendez-Diaz left open: if a forensic
laboratory report triggers the Confrontation Clause, who must provide
the live, in-court testimony? In a controversial 5–4 decision, the Court
held that the analyst who actually conducted the forensic test and
certified the report must take the stand, and that a so-called surrogate
witness does not satisfy the constitutional requirement. This Comment
suggests that the Court accurately assessed the fallibility of forensic
science and correctly decided Bullcoming in a manner that was
consistent with the Confrontation Clause’s purposes.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
June 2006, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Special thanks to Professor
Laurie Levenson for her invaluable guidance, both on writing this Comment and on living life;
her legal brilliance and passion for teaching inspire us all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause requires that a
criminal defendant be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”1
This seemingly straightforward constitutional requirement has long
been the subject of an intense debate, one that defies the stereotypical
battles between conservative and liberal jurists.2 In 2004, Justice
Scalia—whose prosecutor-oriented, law-and-order principles have
earned him a reputation as one of the most politically conservative
U.S. Supreme Court Justices3—authored Crawford v. Washington,4
which expanded criminal defendants’ confrontation rights and paved
the way for the current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.5 In
Crawford, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
defendant’s right to confront, in court, a witness who bears testimony
against the defendant, unless that witness is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.6
Crawford was a groundbreaking decision. It overturned Ohio v.
Roberts7 and more than twenty years of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, refocusing the constitutional inquiry on the
testimonial nature of a witness’s statement, rather than on its indicia
of reliability.8 The Court, however, declined to comprehensively
define “testimonial.”9 Thus began the current line of Confrontation
Clause cases, each of which sought to clarify the Sixth Amendment’s
confrontation protections but arguably clouded any clarity that the
case before it brought.10
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005).
3. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Justice Scalia for the Defense?, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 687, 687
(2011).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. Bibas, supra note 2, at 184; Jeffrey L. Fisher, Originalism As an Anchor for the Sixth
Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 57–62 (2011). For a discussion of how Justice
Scalia’s adherence to the principles of originalism and formalism shaped the Crawford decision,
see also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–60.
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a discussion of the Roberts approach, see infra notes 47–51 and
accompanying text.
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
9. Id. at 68.
10. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–28 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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In 2009, the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,11 in
which it held that a forensic laboratory report prepared for a criminal
trial is “testimonial” and that it therefore triggers the Confrontation
Clause.12 Then, in 2011, the Court decided Bullcoming v. New
Mexico13 and answered the question that Melendez-Diaz left open: if
a forensic laboratory report triggers the Confrontation Clause, who
must provide the live, in-court testimony?14 Is it constitutionally
significant who takes the stand? In a controversial 5–4 decision,15 the
Court held that the analyst who actually conducted the forensic test
and certified the report must take the stand, and a so-called surrogate
witness does not satisfy the constitutional requirement.16
Although the Bullcoming decision is controversial, this
Comment suggests that the Court accurately assessed the fallibility
of forensic science and correctly decided the case in a manner
consistent with the Confrontation Clause’s purposes. Part II outlines
Bullcoming’s key facts and procedural history. Part III explains the
historical framework of criminal defendants’ confrontation rights.
Part IV examines the Court’s reasoning in Bullcoming. Finally,
Part V analyzes the impact of forensic testimony in the context of the
Confrontation Clause’s purposes and ultimately concludes that a
forensic report can be assessed only through the confrontation of the
analyst who conducted the forensic analysis and certified the report.
II. KEY FACTS AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2005, Donald Bullcoming rear-ended his vehicle into
a truck that was stopped at an intersection in Farmington, New
Mexico.17 The truck driver approached Bullcoming to exchange
insurance information and noticed that Bullcoming’s eyes were
bloodshot and that his breath smelled of alcohol.18 The truck driver
told his wife to call the police, but Bullcoming fled the scene.19 The

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Id. at 2532.
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Id. at 2710.
See id. at 2723, 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2710 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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responding police officer quickly found Bullcoming, after which
Bullcoming performed and failed a series of field sobriety tests.20
The police officer arrested Bullcoming for driving a vehicle while
under the influence (DWI).21 At the police station, Bullcoming
refused to take a breath test, so the arresting officer obtained a search
warrant for a blood-alcohol test.22 Bullcoming gave a blood sample
at the local hospital, which was then sent to the New Mexico
Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), to be
tested for blood-alcohol concentration (BAC).23
SLD uses a gas chromatograph machine to calculate BAC
levels.24 Gas chromatography is a widely used scientific method that
analyzes a substance’s quantity within a mixture.25 SLD’s testing
protocol requires analysts to extract two blood samples, place the
samples in vials containing a chemical additive, cap the vials, and
place them in the machine; the machine then produces a
chromatogram (printed graph) and software-generated data
calculations.26 The SLD analyst must have specialized knowledge
and training in the chromatography process.27 He or she “must be
aware of, and adhere to, good analytical practices and understand
what is being done and why” because human error can occur at any
step in the process and invalidate the results.28
Curtis Caylor was the SLD forensic analyst who completed
Bullcoming’s BAC Report (“Report”).29 The Report contained two
certifications: one by a reviewing SLD examiner, who reviewed
Caylor’s analysis and certified Caylor’s qualifications, and another
by Caylor himself.30 Caylor’s certification verified that he had
followed the SLD procedures, which require, among other things,
that the certifying analyst make note on the Report of any
circumstance or condition that might have affected the sample’s

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 5 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
Id. at 2711.
Id. at 2711 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 2711.
Id. at 2711 n.1 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2710.
Id. at 2710–11.
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integrity or the analysis’s validity.31 Caylor left this section blank,
thus implicitly verifying that there was no such circumstance or
condition.32 Caylor specifically certified that Bullcoming’s BAC was
0.21 grams per hundred milliliters, which allowed the state to charge
Bullcoming with an aggravated DWI, a more serious crime than a
regular DWI is (a regular DWI requires a BAC of only 0.16).33
Bullcoming went to trial in November 2005, before the Court
decided Melendez-Diaz.34 On the day of trial, the state announced
that Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed
reason,35 and the prosecution would not be calling him as a witness.36
Instead, the state proposed to introduce the Report as a business
record through the testimony of another SLD analyst, Gerasimos
Razatos, who neither observed Caylor perform Bullcoming’s BAC
test nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis.37 Bullcoming’s counsel objected
that Razatos’s testimony violated Bullcoming’s confrontation right,
but the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the Report.38
The jury convicted Bullcoming.39 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed Bullcoming’s conviction, holding that the Report was
nontestimonial and thus did not trigger the Confrontation Clause.40
While Bullcoming’s appeal was pending at the New Mexico
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz,
holding that written statements in a forensic report were testimonial
and therefore triggered the defendant’s confrontation right.41 The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Bullcoming’s conviction: it
recognized that the Report was testimonial under Melendez-Diaz but
nonetheless did not violate Bullcoming’s confrontation right for two
reasons.42 First, because Caylor only transcribed the gas
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2714.
33. Id. at 2710–11.
34. Id. at 2711.
35. Justice Scalia asked at oral argument why Caylor was placed on unpaid leave, but the
State refused to explain. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 0910876).
36. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711–12.
37. Id. at 2712.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d on other grounds,
226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
41. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
42. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8.
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chromatograph machine’s results—he did not interpret the results or
exercise any independent judgment—Caylor was a “mere scrivener,”
and the gas chromatograph machine was Bullcoming’s true
accuser.43 Second, because the gas chromatograph machine was the
true accuser, the live, in-court testimony of any qualified SLD
analyst, such as Razatos, satisfied Bullcoming’s confrontation
right.44
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
following question:
Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to
introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a
criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst
who did not sign the certification or personally perform or
observe the performance of the test reported in the
certification[?]45
In answering this question, the Court first acknowledged the wellestablished Crawford rule: an out-of-court testimonial statement may
not be introduced against a criminal defendant at trial unless the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
confront him.46 Determining that the Report was testimonial in
nature, the Court reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
judgment, holding that Bullcoming’s confrontation right was violated
when the trial court allowed into evidence the testimonial statement
of one witness, Caylor, through the in-court testimony of another
witness, Razatos.47
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK:
A CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Because the Bullcoming decision is essentially the follow-up
decision to Melendez-Diaz, it is helpful to revisit the Confrontation
Clause’s history before addressing the Court’s reasoning. When it
decided Crawford in 2004, the Court overruled Roberts and radically

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 8–9 (citing United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 9.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.
Id.
Id.
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changed its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.48 Under Roberts,
which the Court decided in 1980, an unavailable declarant’s
statement was admissible if it bore adequate “indicia of reliability,”
either by falling within a hearsay exception or otherwise showing
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”49 Thus, if an out-ofcourt statement “was good enough for the Federal Rules of Evidence,
it was good enough for the confrontation clause.”50 But the Court’s
focus on reliability was confounded: it confused the constitutional
right to confrontation with nonconstitutional evidentiary hearsay
law.51 Courts were forced to apply a multifactor, indeterminate
balancing test.52 Because individual judges weighed factors
differently, results were grossly inconsistent, and case law was in
disarray.53 In Crawford, Justice Scalia used a blend of originalism
and formalism54 to bring order to the case-law chaos and return the
confrontation doctrine to its historical and textual roots.55
The Crawford facts centered on a tape-recorded statement in
which the defendant’s wife described to the police how her husband
stabbed the victim.56 The wife did not testify at trial under the state’s
marital privilege, so the prosecution sought to introduce the wife’s
tape-recorded statement.57 Relying on the Roberts indicia-ofreliability standard, the trial court allowed the prosecution to play the
tape during trial, and the jury convicted the defendant.58 But in a 7–2
decision, the Court reversed and established the Crawford rule:59
“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are
48. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 189–90.
49. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
50. Cyrus P.W. Rieck, How to Deal with Laboratory Reports Under Crawford v.
Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839, 840 (2008).
51. Bibas, supra note 2, at 189.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 189–90 (noting examples where judges gave opposite weight to the same factors
for opposite reasons).
54. Because Justice Scalia is an avid proponent of originalism and formalism—and the text
of the Constitution strongly protects criminal defendants’ rights—his decisions do not always
reflect his conservative ways; Scalia’s philosophies are in stark contrast to the more pragmatic
approach advanced by the dissenting Justices in Bullcoming, who promoted forward-looking,
practical decisions that allow judges to apply general rules in a manner that seems fair. Id.
at 186–88.
55. Id. at 190.
56. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 40–41.
59. Id. at 69.
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admissible] only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”60
Consequently, the Crawford decision “shifted the touchstone of
admissibility from a statement’s reliability to its testimonial
nature.”61
The Court then fleshed out a few definitions of the new
Crawford framework. It defined a “witness” as a person who
“bear[s] testimony,” and it defined “testimony” as “a solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.”62 The Court also provided a nonexhaustive list
of statements that fall within the “testimonial” category—including
affidavits, formalized testimonial materials, and statements that
police officers take during interrogations63—but left “for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”64
That day arrived relatively quickly. Two years later, in 2006, the
Court decided Davis v. Washington,65 which addressed the narrow
question of whether a statement made to the police during a 911 call
is testimonial.66 The Court held that such a statement is testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing
emergency and that the statement’s primary purpose “is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”67 Because the victim who made the call in Davis spoke
about the events as they occurred, as opposed to describing past
events, the Court held that the 911 call’s primary purpose was to
assist with an ongoing emergency and that it therefore did not trigger
the Confrontation Clause.68
60. Id. at 59.
61. Hon. Paul W. Grimm et al., The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: What
Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. Balt. L.F. 155, 157 (2010); see also Bibas, supra
note 2, at 192 (“Crawford’s formalistic rule turns on simple, clear requirements of testimony,
cross-examination, and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of reliability.”).
62. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 68.
65. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
66. Id. at 817.
67. Id. at 822.
68. Id. at 827–28. The Court decided Hammon v. Indiana as a companion case to Davis. Id.
at 819. In Hammon, police responded to a domestic disturbance call. Id. When they arrived at the
home, the victim-wife—who was sitting on the porch—told the officers that her husband shoved
her head into a broken glass heater and punched her in the chest. Id. She later memorialized the
statement in an affidavit. Id. at 820. The husband was charged with domestic battery, the trial
court admitted the wife’s statements through officer testimony and the written affidavit, and the
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The Davis opinion imposed on courts the task of determining a
statement’s primary purpose.69 Thus, while the Court certainly did
not articulate a comprehensive standard for determining whether a
statement is testimonial, it at least brought some clarity to the
nebulous “testimonial” standard by providing one common attribute
that determines when statements are testimonial: “the objective
likelihood that [the statement] be used in trial.”70
Melendez-Diaz was the next case to take up the meaning of
testimonial in the context of forensic reports.71 In Melendez-Diaz, the
prosecution sought to introduce three certificates of analysis—
without calling as witnesses the analysts who prepared the
certificates—to prove that the substance seized from the defendant
was cocaine.72 The trial court admitted the certificates as “prima
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the
narcotic analyzed,” and the jury convicted the defendant.73 The Court
granted certiorari and, in a straightforward Crawford analysis, held
that the documents fell “within the core class of testimonial
statements” that trigger the defendant’s confrontation right.74
IV. THE BULLCOMING
COURT’S REASONING
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court “refused to create a forensic
evidence exception” to the Confrontation Clause and instead required
that a live witness defend a forensic report.75 In Bullcoming, the
Court decided who that live witness must be.76 Justice Ginsburg,
husband was convicted. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 834. Unlike in Davis, there was
no ongoing emergency during the police interrogation; rather, the wife merely described past
events in response to the officer’s questions. Id. at 829–30.
69. Grimm et al., supra note 61, at 158 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
70. Id. at 159.
71. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
72. Id. at 2531.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 2532 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court decided Michigan v. Bryant in
February 2011, after Melendez-Diaz. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). Justice Sotomayor authored the 6–2
decision, which held that police officer testimony about a dying victim’s identification of a
defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause because its primary purpose was to assist with
an ongoing emergency. Id. at 1166–67. As expected, Justice Scalia vehemently dissented. Id. at
1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his is an absurdly easy case. . . . [The victim’s] statements had
little value except to ensure the [defendant’s] arrest and eventual prosecution.”).
75. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713–14 (2011) (citing Melendez-Diaz,
129 S. Ct. at 2536–38).
76. See id. at 2713.
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writing for the majority, held that the Confrontation Clause requires
the live witness to be the person who actually made the testimonial
statement.77 And in Bullcoming, that person was Caylor.78
In addressing why Razatos’s testimony failed to meet the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements, the Court flatly rejected the
New Mexico Supreme Court’s reasoning.79 Because Caylor verified
that he followed SLD protocol and that nothing affected the integrity
of the sample or the validity of the analysis, the Report was the result
of human action, not machine-produced data.80 In this regard, the
New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding was a conduit for
circumventing the Confrontation Clause, equivalent to allowing, for
example, “a note-taking police [officer] [to] recite the . . . testimony
of the declarant.”81 Razatos’s surrogate testimony failed to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements: it could not convey Caylor’s
experience in facilitating and processing Bullcoming’s BAC test or
“expose any lapses or lies on . . . [Caylor’s] part.”82 And, of
particular significance, Razatos had no knowledge as to why Caylor
was placed on unpaid leave, thereby precluding Bullcoming’s
attorney from eliciting testimony to reveal whether Caylor was
removed from his position as a result of incompetence, evasiveness,
or dishonesty.83 Thus, the Court appropriately held that Caylor’s live
testimony was hardly a “hollow formality.”84 It was simply not
enough “that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial
statements provide[d] a fair enough opportunity for crossexamination.”85

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2714–15.
80. Id. at 2713; see also id. at 2715 (noting that although the gas chromatograph machine’s
readout requires no interpretation by SLD analyst, “Caylor certified to more than a machinegenerated number”).
81. Id. at 2715 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2546 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court made clear in Davis that it
will not permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into evidence through the incourt testimony of a second.”).
82. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 & n.8 (noting Razatos’ testimony that “you don’t know
unless you actually observe the analysis that someone else conducts, whether they followed th[e]
protocol in every instance” (alteration in original)).
83. Id. at 2715.
84. Id. at 2716 (quoting id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
85. Id. (emphasis added) (“[T]rue enough, . . . the purpose of the rights set forth in [the
Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded
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Next, the Court categorically rejected the prosecution’s
argument that the Report was nontestimonial: the Report was
unquestionably an “‘affirmation[] made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact’ in a criminal proceeding,”86 so its
sole purpose was evidentiary and therefore testimonial.87 The Court
acknowledged that the Report was not sworn, unlike the certificates
in Melendez-Diaz, but it reconciled this distinction by holding that
“‘the absence of [an] oath [i]s not dispositive’ in determining if a
statement is testimonial.”88 The Report’s formalities, which
resembled those in Melendez-Diaz, were sufficient to render Caylor’s
written statements testimonial: a police officer delivered the blood
sample to the laboratory to assist in a criminal investigation, and an
analyst tested the evidence, prepared a certificate, and formalized it
by signing the document.89
The state, its amici,90 and the dissenting Justices stressed the
undue burden that the Court’s opinion imposed on the prosecution,91
echoing the argument raised in Melendez-Diaz that the Court relax
the Confrontation Clause’s requirements to accommodate the
necessities of the criminal justice system.92 But just as the Court
swiftly rejected these arguments in Melendez-Diaz, it similarly
rejected them in Bullcoming, reiterating the various ways in which
the prosecution could offer this type of forensic evidence at trial.93
The Court also emphasized that because only a small fraction of
criminal cases go to trial, and within those cases defendants
generally stipulate the admission of forensic analyses, a defendant
so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006))).
86. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532).
87. Id. at 2717 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532).
88. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010)).
89. Id.
90. Amici included the Attorneys General of thirty-four states, the National District
Attorneys Association with other professional associations, and the State of Mexico Department
of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division.
91. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717; see also id. at 2727–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(explaining that despite the majority’s position, the decision will “impose an undue burden on the
prosecution”).
92. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
93. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717–18 (only Justices Ginsburg and Scalia supported this
reasoning). For example, Razatos could have retested Bullcoming’s original sample, or the
prosecution could have used a notice-and-demand procedure that would have allowed Bullcoming
to assert his Confrontation Clause right after he received notice of the prosecution’s intent to use
the Report. Id. at 2718.
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will seldom insist on live testimony from the forensic analyst.94 The
Court looked to statistics to emphasize this final point,95 noting that
in post-Melendez-Diaz Michigan, in-court, forensic-analyst
testimony had increased only from .07 percent in 2006 to 1 percent
in 2010.96 In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that
the state was and is fully capable of ensuring that the certifying
forensic analyst appears at trial.97
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the
factual scenarios that the majority did not address, suggesting four
different circumstances in which such a forensic laboratory report
could be admitted without the testimony of the certifying forensic
analyst.98 First, Sotomayor noted that a forensic lab report might be
admissible if its primary purpose was something other than criminal
evidence, such as providing medical treatment.99 Second, she pointed
out that this was not a case where the so-called surrogate witness was
“a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit
limited, connection to the scientific test at issue,” suggesting that
Bullcoming might have come out differently if the witness had been
a supervisor who actually observed the analysis.100 Third, Sotomayor
indicated that an expert might testify with his independent opinion
about the underlying forensic analysis without the report itself being
admitted into evidence.101 Finally, Sotomayor emphasized that the
situation might have been different if the prosecution had only
sought to introduce the machine-generated results—for example, the
chromatogram—as opposed to the Report with Caylor’s testimonial
statements.102

94. Id. at 2718–19 (“[N]early 95% of convictions . . . are obtained via guilty plea.” (quoting
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540)).
95. Id. at 2719 n.10. It is noteworthy that the dissenting Justices used different statistics to
make the opposite point. See id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
96. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 n.10 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia et al. in Support of Petitioner at 21, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (No. 09-10876)).
97. Id. at 2719.
98. Id. at 2721–22 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 2722 (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 703) (emphasizing that Razatos did not offer an expert opinion
about Bullcoming’s BAC).
102. Id.
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Justice Kennedy—with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito
and Breyer joining—penned a zealous dissent, rejecting both the
specific Bullcoming holding and the general line of Crawford
Confrontation Clause cases.103 The dissent initially distinguished
Bullcoming from the facts of Melendez-Diaz, asserting that Razatos’s
testimony and cross-examination were fully consistent with the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements.104 Unlike in Melendez-Diaz,
the Report was not a notarized affidavit but merely a “routine
authentication” that could be fully examined by the in-court
testimony of any qualified SLD analyst.105 Further, the dissent
asserted that Caylor’s role in the Report was no greater than the roles
of the other people in the chain of custody—for example, those who
handled the blood sample’s receipt and storage, each of whose acts
had their own evidentiary significance.106 If the Court was not going
to require the government to call as witnesses each person in the
chain of custody, the dissent’s argument went, then Caylor’s
testimony would have been no more significant than Razatos’s
testimony was.107
The dissent also expressed particular dissatisfaction with the
Court’s Crawford jurisprudence, favoring instead the Roberts
approach.108 The dissent accused the majority of using the reliability
of evidence “as a reason to exclude it”109 and argued that the
Crawford approach requires judges “to struggle to apply an
‘amorphous, if not entirely subjective,’ ‘highly context-dependent
inquiry.’”110 Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s use of
statistics to emphasize that the Bullcoming decision will not impose
an undue burden on the state, and it looked instead to contrary
statistics that show how the Bullcoming decision will continue to
103. Id. at 2723–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2723–24.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2724 (citing Razatos’s testimony that “once the material is prepared and placed in
the machine, you don’t need any particular expertise to record the results”).
107. Id. It is notable, however, that the State conceded during oral arguments that the chain of
custody was not contested in Bullcoming and that it is generally not contested. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 35, at 47–48.
108. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2725.
110. Id. at 2726 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011)) (arguing that the
elusive distinction between testimonial statements (proving past events) and non-testimonial
statements (helping the police in an ongoing emergency) does little to clarify the Confrontation
Clause standard).

626

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:613

disrupt the way that crime labs operate and courts conduct criminal
trials.111
V. ANALYSIS
The critics of the Bullcoming decision unduly focused on the
burden that the decision will impose on states without regard to what
the Court has articulated are the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause: (1) ensuring that a witness gives his testimony under oath,
which highlights the seriousness of the matter and, with the threat of
perjury, protects against false testimony; (2) subjecting a witness to
cross-examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth”; and (3) allowing a jury to judge a witness’s
credibility by observing his demeanor.113 With these purposes in
mind, the critics’ preferred indicia-of-reliability approach only
operates to eviscerate the constitutional protections for
confrontation.114
Regarding the first purpose—ensuring that a witness gives his
testimony under oath—the Court had to address an underlying issue
in Bullcoming: who was Bullcoming’s accuser, Caylor or the gas
chromatograph machine? The critics maintained that the machine
was the true accuser, putting particular emphasis on the advanced
technological nature of the machine and on SLD’s strict testing
protocols.115 Accordingly, their argument went, because the machine
does not tolerate “individualized . . . BAC testing”116 and a computer
112

111. Id. at 2728 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae National District Attorneys Association et al. in
Support of Respondent, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter DAA Brief]
(observing that each of California’s blood-alcohol analysts process an average of 3,220 cases per
year); Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Bullcoming,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) (explaining that Los Angeles’s ten toxicologists spent 782 hours
at 261 court appearances during a one-year period); Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New
Mexico Department of Health Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent,
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter SLD Brief] (noting a 71 percent
increase in subpoenas in New Mexico that require analysts to testify in DWI cases)).
112. Any reference to “critics” includes the Bullcoming dissenting Justices and the State of
New Mexico and its amici.
113. Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause: A Case Study in
Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1997) (citing
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
114. Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 740–41
(2008).
115. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 15.

Winter 2012]

BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO

627

interprets the forensic results,117 the machine was Bullcoming’s
accuser, thereby eliminating any constitutional objection to Razatos’
testimony.118 But this argument missed the point entirely. The issue
was not how SLD analysts typically analyze BAC samples, but how
Caylor specifically analyzed Bullcoming’s BAC sample.119 Caylor
was the real witness against Bullcoming, and the manner in which
Caylor analyzed Bullcoming’s BAC sample directly addressed the
second purpose of the Confrontation Clause—the discovery of truth.
During Bullcoming’s trial, the prosecution sought to prove that
Bullcoming’s BAC was over 0.16 grams per hundred milliliters, the
minimum content required to charge Bullcoming with the moreserious aggravated DWI.120 Thus, to discharge the truth-seeking
function of the Confrontation Clause, the Court was correct to
emphasize both forensic science’s fallibility and the possibility for
human error in the analysis. The critics continuously attempted to
mask forensic science’s imperfections, suggesting that the “anecdotal
horror stories about inaccurate laboratory results . . . are red
herrings,”121 and there is nothing inherently infallible about
forensics.122 Rather, the imperfection and associated risks of forensic
science highlight exactly why a defendant’s right to confrontation
cannot be trivialized in this context.123
Unfortunately, popular television shows portray forensic science
in a sensational light that simply does not exist in real life.124
Contrary to popular belief, most forensic disciplines—including
fingerprint analysis, ballistics, bite marks, footprints, tire tracks,
117. Id. at 19.
118. Id. at 37; see also DAA Brief, supra note 111, at 15 (“A qualified witness such as
Razatos . . . could review the analysis, explain the results and how they were produced as well as
the original person . . . by virtue of the laboratory protocol . . . .”).
119. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. in
Support of Petitioner, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter NACDL Brief]
(“Cross-examining a surrogate witness is like cross-examining a textbook—an attorney can only
discover what should have happened rather than what actually happened.”).
120. N.M. STAT. § 66-8-102(D)(1) (2011).
121. DAA Brief, supra note 111, at 17.
122. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (“Forensic evidence is
not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”); NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30
(noting forensic science is “anything but infallible,” and is fraught by the very human errors that
lead to contamination and inaccurate reports).
123. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Bullcoming,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Innocence Brief].
124. Id. at 12 n.23 (estimating upwards of forty percent of the forensic science on CSI: Crime
Scene Investigation (CSI) does not currently exist in real life).
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handwriting, and bloodstain patterns—have not been subject to
rigorous scientific study and have little, if any, scientific basis.125 In
2009, the National Academy of Sciences released a report126 that
shattered “any perception that the forensic sciences are beyond
reproach.”127 The report noted that poorly trained analysts often
handle forensic testing and then exaggerate the methodology’s
accuracy in court.128
Chromatography, which is based on organic chemistry and
microbiology, is actually one of the few forensic disciplines that
have been subject to scientific review.129 But, even so, many
laboratories lack meaningful protocols to guard against sample
contamination and other human errors.130 The recent uncovering of
crime-lab scandals across the United States highlights the problems
of inaccuracy and fabrication in forensics131 and confirms that
incompetent forensic analysis is neither new nor isolated.132 For
example, in 2010, a crime-lab investigation in San Francisco
revealed several disturbing patterns of neglect: analysts often left
drug evidence unsecured and unattended, failed to accurately
document when evidence was opened for sampling, and failed to
calibrate testing devices.133 In one particularly alarming incident, an
analyst mixed up a DNA evidentiary sample with a control sample

125. Id. at 13 (“[W]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.” (quoting COMM.
ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf)).
126. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., supra note 125.
127. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 5.
128. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld,
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009)
(“Traditionally, there has been almost no oversight of what scientists say in the courtroom once
the court deems the method used valid and reliable.”). One study found that in 60 percent of cases
where defendants were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated, a forensic analyst gave
inaccurate testimony. Id. at 9.
129. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 128, at 13; Brad Reagan, CSI Myths: The Shaky Science
Behind Forensics, POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 18, 2009, 3:28 AM), http://www.popular
mechanics.com/science/health/forensics/4325774.
130. See Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 3236.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 16–18.
133. Id. at 17–18.
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on the eve of a criminal trial and then attempted to cover up his error,
destroying evidence of the mix-up.134
There have been similar reports of faulty blood-alcohol forensic
testing, confirming that even credible scientific disciplines are
vulnerable to error.135 A recent investigation of Colorado Springs’s
crime lab, for example, revealed that, in a two-year period, more than
two hundred blood-alcohol tests were erroneously high; each test
was attributable to a single analyst who had been injecting improper
levels of propanol into blood samples.136 At another laboratory in
Washington, an investigation uncovered that a toxicology
laboratory’s supervisor had been falsifying and covering up bloodalcohol certifications.137 These few examples drive home an
important aspect of Bullcoming’s argument: technology cannot
correct the human error and improper conduct that invalidate
forensic test results.
Another layer of concern is the intrinsic bias within forensic
science. The critics would have everyone believe that forensic
analysts are impartial.138 But there is nothing inherently objective
about forensic analysis. Police, not scientists, created forensic
science as a “reliable way[] to match patterns from clues with
evidence tied to suspects,” focusing almost exclusively on the
outcome, with little regard for the process.139 Moreover, forensic
laboratories operate at the beck and call of the investigating officers
and prosecution,140 and analysts likely feel pressure to produce
findings that are favorable to prosecution.141
A discussion of the Confrontation Clause’s truth-seeking
function also requires a mention of the jury, the individuals who
ultimately decide the truth. A defendant’s right to confront the

134. Id. at 18. Other examples include a 2006 audit of a Houston crime laboratory and a 2008
investigation of a Detroit crime laboratory, both of which uncovered “shocking level[s] of
incompetence,” such as routine failure to use required scientific controls, to follow procedures to
minimize contamination risks, and to properly calculate statistics. Id. at 17–18. The Detroit
laboratory was permanently closed. Id. at 17.
135. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 32.
136. Id. at 32–33.
137. Id. at 33.
138. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 30.
139. Reagan, supra note 129.
140. See SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 2 (“Like all New Mexico’s state agencies . . . [SLD] is
legally required to assist law enforcement without charging fees for its work.”).
141. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 20–21.
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certifying forensic analyst is most prevalent in this context because
forensic testimony is incredibly persuasive to jurors,142 sometimes
even more compelling than eyewitness testimony.143 In what is
sometimes called the “CSI Effect,”144 jurors attach to “the mistaken
notion that criminal science is fast and infallible and always gets its
man.”145 As evidenced by the discussion above, that perceived
infallibility is simply unrealistic,146 and it underscores the
significance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine the analyst
who actually performed the forensic testing.
With this framework in mind, allowing the jury to observe that
analyst’s demeanor and judge his credibility—the third purpose of
the Confrontation Clause—is the most effective way to expose any
ignorance, incompetence, mistake, or fraud that is associated with a
forensic analysis of the defendant.147 The critics sidestepped the
constitutional significance of this in-court testimony, suggesting that
it would be unbelievable for an analyst to say that she remembers
any particular sample that she had run.148 But, again, the critics
missed the point. Even if Caylor had testified that he had no
recollection of Bullcoming’s test, the defense counsel could have still
inquired about why Caylor was placed on leave, what steps he took
and judgments he made while analyzing Bullcoming’s blood sample,
and whether he understood and followed SLD’s testing protocol.149
Surrogate witnesses, though competent analysts themselves, are
142. Id. at 3 (“In courts across the country, forensic science plays a vital role in the factfinding process.”).
143. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. in
Support of Petitioner at 8, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876)
[hereinafter PD Brief].
144. In the CSI television series, investigators use cutting-edge (and costly) technology to
solve difficult cases. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., supra
note 125, at 48; see also Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect and Its Real-Life Impact on Justice,
THE PROSECUTOR, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 10 (providing background information on the CSI Effect
phenomenon and the results of a study on whether the CSI Effect has affected the criminal justice
system in Maricopa County, Arizona).
145. 2 FITZGERALD, INTOXICATION TEST EVIDENCE § 57:23 (2d ed. 2011) (quoting Richard
Willing, ‘CSI Effect’ Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at A1)
available at Westlaw INTOX.
146. Id.
147. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct.
2527, 2536 (2009)).
148. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 26.
149. See Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 6; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.
554, 564 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause’s cross-examination requirement is
satisfied even if the witness has almost no memory of the underlying facts).
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likely unaware of any errors that the analyst who performed the test
committed.150 Their presumptive testimony—that the testing analyst
properly and impartially performed the test—simply cannot satisfy
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.151
With the Confrontation Clause’s purposes in mind, the critics’
main objection—that the Bullcoming decision imposes an undue
burden on the states—can be properly addressed. Aside from the fact
that financial burden “cannot be the tail that wags the dog” for
constitutional interpretation,152 it is not a bad thing that Bullcoming
will require states to invest more resources in their forensic
laboratories and procedures. Rather, it is a good thing: it will help
ensure that criminal defendants are not wrongfully convicted because
of faulty forensic evidence, and there are several procedures that
states can reasonably implement to ensure that they prosecute
defendants in accordance with their confrontation rights. For
example, prosecutors could depose the testing forensic analyst to
preserve his testimony, even before charges are brought; prosecutors
could have the testifying analyst reanalyze the blood before trial; a
qualified witness who observed the analysis could testify to it even if
he did not actually perform the test; and laboratories could
continuously record the forensic testing—similar to how videotaped
autopsies render live trial testimony unnecessary—thereby allowing
another witness to identify the analyst and an expert to examine the
analysis and render an opinion on it.153 Additionally, laboratories
could create procedures whereby supervisors thoroughly review all
forensic testing, allowing them to testify at trials while they continue
to work as analysts in the laboratory. Although each of these
suggestions will indeed cost money when most states are in
budgetary crises, the costs are worth the additional protections
against wrongful convictions and the constitutional guarantees that
are afforded to criminal defendants.

150. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 34.
151. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 6.
152. PD Brief, supra note 143, at 26.
153. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24,
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court correctly decided Bullcoming consistent with the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, heeding the real-world
dangers of forensic testing while establishing a standard that is both
principled and pragmatic. If the Court had adopted the critics’
reasoning, prosecutors could exclusively use surrogate witnesses to
introduce forensic testimony, denying criminal defendants an
opportunity to discover a fraudulent or incompetent analyst. The
obvious risks of false forensic testimony make clear that the
reliability of a forensic report can be assessed in only one way:
through confrontation of the analyst who conducted the tests and
certified the report. Any resulting costs of the Bullcoming decision
are substantially outweighed by the preservation of the constitutional
guarantees that protect criminal defendants.

